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Japan and Germany were allies during World War II, and both countries committed
crimes. Even though the Nazi persecution of Jews in Germany was unprecedented in
history, Japan has also been found guilty of serious misdemeanours. Today, Germany
acknowledges the magnitude of its responsibility and strives to deal with this legacy.
However, in Japan, we find no consensus on dealing with the matter. Nonetheless, it
would be short-sighted to conclude that Germany did a better job than Japan from
the outset. In analysing the different approaches to remembrance culture in the two
countries, we use the theoretical framework of civil religion to assess the impacts of
the respective civil religions on the culture of commemoration. We hereby analyzed
the structural factors as well as the influence of individual political behaviour.
Immediately after the war, neither Germany nor Japan were interested in coming to
terms with their past. Both countries were subject to Western integration, and both
countries experienced remarkable economic growth. One of the major differences
between both countries concerns civil religion. While Germany no longer relied on
strong nationalism-based politics and instead pursued European integration, in
Japan. Shintôism has continued to influence feelings of national belonging, making
it more difficult to establish a critical dialogue with the past. Further differences are
apparent: the Western origin of Japan’s constitution, the conflicting international
environment in Japan, the late regime change, differences in education and, most
importantly, the impacts of generational change in Germany. The 1968 student
generation strongly condemned Nazi aggression and demanded that the older
generation face responsibility, which strongly contributed to a reappraisal of the past
in the public sphere.
Keywords: Civil religion, Remembrance culture, Japan, Germany, 1968 student
protestsIntroduction
Japan and Germany were allies during World War II, and both countries commit-
ted crimes, especially in neighbouring countries. Although the Nazi persecution of
Jews in Germany was unprecedented in history, Japan has also been found guilty
of serious crimes, such as the massacre of Nanjing and forced prostitution, which
is discussed as the ‘comfort women’ issue.1
In its official politics, Germany acknowledges the magnitude of its responsibility
for some of the worst crimes in European history, and strives to deal with this2016 The Author(s). Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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Schmidt Asian Journal of German and European Studies  (2016) 1:10 Page 2 of 22legacy. However, in Japan, we find no consensus on dealing with war crimes.
Although several efforts were made to address the past or even to apologise, the
official government position remains unclear. During her visit in Japan in March
2015, the German Chancellor, Merkel, urged Japan to confront its wartime
conduct, citing Germany’s ability to “face our history” and reconcile with victims of
its Nazi past (McCurry 2015).
However, it would be short-sighted to conclude that Germany did a better job
than Japan from the outset. In analysing the different approaches to remembrance
culture in the two countries, we use the theoretical framework of civil religion to
assess the impact of the respective civil religion on remembrance culture. This
concept was introduced by Jean Jacques Rousseau in the late 18th century (Book 4,
Chapter 8 of his Contract Social, 1762). Here, he describes what he considered a
set of quasi-religious attitudes essential for making a country the object of the
citizens’ adoration. In this view, civil religion is consciously “designed” by leaders
to exert social control over the citizenry (Coleman 1970: especially p. 67; p. 69).
This concept was further developed by Robert N. Bellah in his essay Civil religion
in America (1967). According to Bellah, who stands in the tradition of Durkheim,
civil religion is a common set of fundamental beliefs, values or rituals of a given
society. Since it stems from the underlying culture, it develops naturally within a
certain society and primarily has an integrative function (Bellah, 1967: p. 4; Christi,
2001: pp. 4 ff.).2 Overall, a civil religion can be seen as the mode of citizenship and
shared national self-understanding or a nation’s national identity. It is a widely accepted
fact that national identities are negotiated via discourse that affects the culture of
commemoration and vice versa. 3
Based on these two main theoretical interpretations of civil religion, we seek to
asses the importance of history and culture, i.e. the social circumstances (Bellah’s
sociological approach or ‘structure’) and to clarify the roles of political leadership
and regime change, i.e. individual political action (Rousseau’s political approach or
‘agency’) in framing each country’s civil religion and its manifestation in a specific
culture of remembrance. We thus presuppose a complementary effect of structural
factors and individual agency.4
We will address the following subquestions: Concerning the structural aspects,
we wish to know about the embededdness of the respective pre-war totalitarian
ideologies into traditional cultures, to assess how each civil religion was trans-
formed through the process of democratization and to determine the origins of the
post-war order, to investigate into the differences in victim myths and offender
consciousness and to highlight the differences in the political environments
(integrative European environment vs. a growing China).
Concerning the political and ideological aspects, i.e. the role of the political
leaders and their actions, we seek to assess regime change’s role in the acceptance
of apologies and to investigate into the differences within the two post-war genera-
tions concerning collective memory, thus altering concepts of citizenship and
national identity and remembrance culture via political protest and generational
change. Since the nation-state effectively controls the content of education, we
further seek to assess to what extent these differences are shaped by differences in
education. Considering that history shapes a civil religion and a remembrance
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matrix of time, we follow a more or less chronological sequence in our analysis.Civil religion and remembrance culture in Germany
Civil religion in the Third Reich
Third Reich ideology was mainly based on ethnic criteria. Specifically, Darwin’s On
the origins of species by means of natural selection, or the preservation of favoured
races in the struggle of life (1859) played a major role in defining Germany as the
Herrenvolk (master race). Even though some define Darwin as a scholar of “liberal
progressive cast”, he was responsible for the theory of natural selection as a mech-
anism of evolution (Burleigh and Wippermann 2003: p. 28). Houston Stewart
Chamberlain was very influential in fusing Social Darwinism with anti-Semitism.5
According to this author, the Germans were superior to other races, and this
superiority was threatened by the Jews. In Mein Kampf, Hitler proposed that
Germanic peoples were the purest of the Aryan race and were therefore the master
race. The Chinese and Japanese were seen as “culture bearing races”, while others races,
such as Blacks or Slavs, were categorized as inferior. The Jews were seen as the embodi-
ment of evil (Burleigh and Wippermann 2003: pp. 36–38). Thus, the Aryan race had to be
maintained and improved, and interbreeding with ‘less valuable races’ would inevitably
lead to an extinction of the Aryan race. This anti-Semitism eventually culminated in the
Holocaust.
The term Lebensraum (living space) was first used by renowned Leipzig Univer-
sity geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844 to 1904). Two elements of this concept
were crucial: First, Ratzel’s emphasis on migration and colonialisation in occupy-
ing new space by a certain species; second, the notion that human culture
depends directly on land and the methods of agriculture (Smith 1980: pp. 52–54).
Lebesraum ideology became a major part of Nazism, referring to Germany’s
expansion into territories held by the Soviet Union, justified by the need for
agricultural land in order to maintain the German nation. In Mein Kampf, Hitler
articulated Lebensraum as a kind of natural law, through which the superior
Aryan race has the right to displace inferior races in order to achieve new
Lebensraum (Lee 2003: p. 237). The politics of Lebensraum explicitly assumed the
racial superiority of Germans as the master race that, by virtue of their superior-
ity, had the right to displace any people deemed to be of inferior racial quality
(Baranowski 2011: p. 141.).
Another element was the idealisation of tradition and folklore. The Nazis’ inter-
est in folklore is addressed in a number of publications. Specifically, Alfred
Rosenberg’s6 Kulturgemeinde issued a flood of literature on Nordic-Germanic
literature. Its two major journals were primarily dedicated to Nordic-Germanic
symbols, traditional folk art and folklore derived from peasant ancestors. First and
foremost, this folklore was the quest for cultural unity of the Volk. Attention was
drawn on alien elements in German culture and foreign influences, even human-
ism, which led to a distinction between the academic upper classes (who could
speak Latin, Italian or French) and the common folk (Kamenetsky 1972: pp. 221–
224). Nordic-Germanic culture was praised as the ‘native culture’ and soon
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and religious order of the Nordic-Germanic tribes was the order of the future
and that the Roman civilization of the past had serious weakened German folk
culture. The Nazis contrasted ‘healthy’ peasant culture and ‘degenerate’ city
culture by stressing the significance of family bonds, village customs, traditional
peasant festivals, folk music, folk dances, processions and so on. According to the
Third Reich’s Blood-and-Soil Program (Blut und Boden), the peasantry was seen as
the Nordic race’s life source, even though the peasants’ contribution to the Reich was
insignificant. However, it remains questionable whether Hitler believed in the folklore
policies, since he greatly admired bombastic and monumental city style, reflected in
his plans to make Germany’s capital, Berlin, as the world capital Germania
(Kamenetsky 1972: pp. 227–28, p. 234).
The Nazis wanted to transform the subjective consciousness of the German
people into a single-minded, obedient ‘national community’. Thus, they wanted to
replace class, regional and, specifically, religious allegiances (Kershaw 2000: pp.
173–74). Even though there was some diversity of views among the Nazi leaders
as to the future of religion in Germany, Hitler favoured the Protestant religion,
and under the Gleichschaltungsprozess, he sought to create a unified Protestant
Reich Church (Deutsche Evangelische Kirche) with the goal of eradicating the
churches’ influence. According to Shirer (1990: p. 240), the new church could not
have any priests; Reich orators would address congregations. All crucifixes,
pictures of saints and the Bible would be banned. Instead, Mein Kampf, would
replace the Bible as the most sacred book. However, owing to strong resistance
by the churches, this plan failed.
The Catholic Church was subject to persecution, but in 1933 the Reich signed a
Concordat with Rome that pledged respect for the autonomy of churches’. How-
ever, the Reich disregarded the Concordat, and all religious institutions that were
not strictly religious were closed down. Payne (1996: p. 9.) has argued that fascism
basically presupposed a post-Christian, post-religious and secular frame of refer-
ence. Thus, it was fundamental to fascism to create a civil religion that would bind
the nation together in a new common faith and loyalty.
Although it failed to use the Protestant church as a hub to create a new civil
religion (more of an uncivil religion), Mein Kampf became the ‘holy book’ in this
religion; Hitler himself was the highest sacred authority, known as the Führerprinzip
(leader principle), which meant that the Führer’s word was beyond written law. In the
words of Schmitt (1934: p. 38), this provided Hitler with the authority to serve as the
“highest form of administrative justice”.
Some authors have thought to trace the roots of Nazism deep in the German
past and national character, yet, as Stackelberg (2007: p. 24) has argued, those
studies unreflectively echo the Nazis own claims of embodying Germany’s great
cultural traditions. There is no doubt that many of these ideas were already in ex-
istence, such as Fichte’s renowned addresses to the German Nation,7 which became
a founding document of German nationalists, or Nietzsche’s claim that “God is
dead” and his concept of the Übermensch,8 yet these ideas were misused by the
Nazis and reworked into a very different political and cultural concept. 9 Despite
the Nazis cynical evocation of German cultural traditions, Germany’s pre-WWII
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these ideas to create their conception of a fascist society.Civil religion and remembrance culture and in post-war Germany
Zero hour in Germany and democratic rebirth
After fascism and the Holocaust, as the most excessive rupture of civilisation in history,
West Germans10 resisted patriotism and nationalism. Although many were indoctrinated
by Nazi ideology, the crime was too apparent to publicly defend this ideology It is undeni-
able that many Germans saw themselves as victims. Specifically the suffering of those,
who were expelled from their homelands in Eastern Europe let to victimization tendencies
and “victim myths”. In light of the atrocities committed by Germans during the war, how-
ever, there were limits to victim discourses (Stackelberg 2007: p. 49).
Between 1945 and 1949, 13 trials were carried out in Nuernberg (the Nuernberg
Trials) to bring Nazi criminals to justice. Although Adolf Hitler and other high-
ranking officials committed suicide and were never brought to trial, Nazi party
officials and high-ranking military officers, along with German industrialists, law-
yers and doctors, were accused. During the first trial against major war criminals
between 1945 and 1946, 12 were sentenced to dead by hanging, one in absentia.
Of the 177 people indicted in the subsequent trials, 24 defendants received death
sentences and 20 others life in prison, and an additional 98 people received
sentences of varying lengths.11
In 1948, the three western occupying powers (USA, Great Britain and France) as well
as the western neighbours of Germany debated the future of the western occupation
zones and agreed on establishing a federal West German state. On 1 September 1948,
the Parliamentary Council (Parlamentarischer Rat) was inaugurated to draft the Basic
Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz). Many of its members, specific-
ally those from the Social Democratic Party, had been prosecuted during the time of
fascism or had been in exile.12 Pressured by the Office of Military Government for
Germany (OMGUS), which sought to influence the concrete design of democracy, the
council adopted the constitution on 8 May 1949 despite conflicts among the parties
concerning the level of decentralization, finance or voting system.13 Shortly thereafter,
it was approved by the Western Supreme Commanders. However, since the public
was excluded from this process, public acceptance and understanding was very low:
40 % had no interest in the new constitution, while only 21 % showed some interest.
Until the start of the 1950s, a majority shared the opinion that the totalitarian Nazi
regime was based on a good idea that was unfortunately poorly implemented (Noelle
and Neumann 1956: p. 134, according to Vorländer 2009). This changed only gradually
over the course of time.
In 1949, the main question in Germany was whether to democratize the country and
to integrate the mid-level National Socialist (NS) elite or to reappraise history and to
punish those guilty of NS crimes. The new political elite chose the first option, since
there was a great desire to get rid of all the guilt. Nijhuis (2016: pp. 2–3) called it a
“limited political purge”, because rigorous de-Nazification would have been detrimental
to the reconstruction of Germany and would have made it more difficult to integrate
citizens into the new political order. Until the end of the 1950s, no one spoke about
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emergence of the cold war, the U.S. also lost interest in denazification. In 1951 this
process officially ended when the Entnazifizierungsschlussgesetz (law ending the process
of denazification) was passed, and many officials were allowed to return to office.14
The Cold War, European integration and economic growth
As a consequence of WWII and the split of Europe into East and West, the European
Coal and Steel Community was formed at the start of the 1950s to achieve military secur-
ity and economic growth and to promote a lasting reconciliation between France and
Germany. Some years later, the Treaty of Rome was signed, the cornerstone for the
European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor organisation of the
European Union (EU).
Since the Holocaust had made it difficult to develop a new German national identity,
or rely on the old identity, economic success filled this gap. The slogan ‘Made in
Germany’ filled West Germans with pride and allowed them to find a positive moment
of identification (von Dirke 1997: p. 13). Owing to the intensifying Cold War, Germany
was accepted into NATO in 1955, and the ongoing process of European integration
was the main instrument for ensuring renewed acceptance from its neighbouring coun-
tries. Since Germany renounced any fight for national interests, and pursued and finan-
cially supported the process of European integration, it managed to transform itself
from a hated country into a respected partner within a very short time. Since Germany
had given up on thinking in national terms, Europe became the “Ersatz nation” for the
discredited nation-state (Nijhuis 2016: p. 2, p. 6).
At the 10th anniversary of the failed 20 July plot of resistance fighters attempting to
kill Hitler, a first memorial service was held, with then President Theodor Heuss (1884
to 1963, President from 1949 to 1959) in attendance. Before this event, only one-third
of Germans said that they had a positive opinion about the men who sought to over-
throw the Nazi regime. After this speech, public opinion began to shift. Today, 20 July
is an integral part of Germany’s cultural memory (Dittrich 2014).
Starting with the widely publicized desecration of a synagogue in Cologne on Christmas
day 1959, however, a wave of anti-Jewish incidents swept across Germany and other coun-
tries (Ehrlich 1962). Until end January 1960, 470 anti-Semitic attacks were reported in
West Germany (Bergmann 1990). Awakened by the anti-Semitic events of the winter
1959/60 and in response to other countries’ reactions, the first serious activities towards a
stronger contemplation of NS history began at the start of the 1960s.
1968 and beyond: student protest and regime change as a driving force for assuming
responsibility
The major driving force behind coping with the past was the student protests in
the 1960s. The anti-Semitic wave at the end of the 1950s, together with the debate
of whether or not the Nazi crimes should be exempted from the statutory 20-year
limitation period15 in the run-up to the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials 1963–65, led to
the student protests, which demanded that Germany deal honestly with its past.
To the students, who were not involved in the crimes and were educated in post-
war Germany, the German chapter of fascism was not yet closed. Many former
National Socialists were still working for the government or at German universities.
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1969) had been a member of the Nazi Party. In addition, the newly formed right-
wing National Democratic Party (NPD) was attracting more and more voters.
The protests, among other events such as the passing of the German Emergency
Law,16 were fuelled by the Auschwitz trials, which attracted much publicity in
Germany. The first edition of Kursbuch, edited by Hans-Magnus Enzensberger, which
soon became the journal of the new left, intensively covered the Auschwitz process.
Specifically, Martin Walser’s (1965) essay Unser Auschwitz rouses a wide public inter-
est and led to a renewed confrontation with Germany’s past. Particularly, the exhib-
ition Ungesühnte Nazijustiz (Unpunished Nazi Justice), which was initiated in different
cities by the West Socialist German Student League (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studen-
tenbund, SDS), attracted much attention. The students gathered together wrong judg-
ments from the National Socialist time and made known the responsible judges and
prosecutors, specifically those who were still in office (Kraushaar 2008: chapter 3). The
students also had a close look at their universities, identifying professors with a Nazi
past, demanding their dismissal, which let to severe conflicts within the universities.17
The East German regime fuelled this development by publishing details of Nazi collab-
oration of West German politicians.18 The generational conflict in Germany over this
time found expression in the popular slogan Die Väter sind die Täter (the fathers are
the offenders).
In 1969, regime change took place in Germany. The Social Democrats’ Willy
Brandt (1913 to 1992, Chancellor from 1969 to 1974), a resistance fighter who had
been in exile during the Nazi regime, became Chancellor. When he visited Poland
in December 1970, he knelt before the monument of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising
against the Nazi regime. This became known as the Warsaw Genuflection. According to
a survey of the time, not all Germans considered the Kniefall was appropriate. Specifically,
among the middle-aged generations a majority found it excessive, while among the younger
generations, a majority considered it appropriate (Spiegel Umfrage, 1970). Internationally,
the reaction was very positive. In 1971, Brandt received the Nobel Peace Prize. In her Award
Ceremony Speech, the Nobel Committee’s President, Mrs. Aase Lionæs, said:
“Brandt’s East European policy is an attempt to bury hatred and seek reconciliation
across the mass graves of the war. How important it was for him personally to carry
out this task of reconciliation is demonstrated by his kneeling by the Jewish
memorial in the former ghetto of Warsaw.”19
The value change that began with the 1968 student protests and that took place
in all advanced industrial nations increased support for democracy, tolerance of
foreigners and ethnic minorities and support for gender equality. It changed atti-
tudes towards the environment, religion, work, family, politics, national identity,
culture, diversity and subjective well-being, especially among the post-war gener-
ation. However, it was pointed out that, in Germany, it manifested itself as a clash
between generations, namely the war and the post-war generations. Whilst the war
generation preferred materialistic values and an authoritarian regime, the younger
post-war generation showed support for post-materialistic values and a libertarian
political regime. Kielmansegg (2000: 358) has called Germany the “Republic of two
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also vanished. Thus, some have argued that we are witnessing an end of Germany’s
unique path of value change and are seeing some kind of “normalization” (van
Deth 2001: p. 30).The Holocaust series and official education
In 1979, the U.S. TV series Holocaust was aired in Germany, with an estimated
viewership with up to 15 million households, leading to an increased public inter-
est into the crimes committed during the Nazi era. After each episode of Holocaust
was aired, a panel of historians answered questions from people who phoned in.
Many were shocked, stating that they were born after 1945, and that it was the
first time they had heard about the genocide. They wanted to know how this could have
occurred and why they had never learnt about it at school (Ludtke 1993: pp. 544–46). In
1979, Holocaust became the word of the year.
In the 1980s, it was discussed how the Holocaust could be included into the educa-
tion curriculum. The subject increasingly formed part of education (Wetzel 2008).
Today, it is official policy that a past that is not examined fully and honestly will be a
burden to the future. Thus, the subject of the Holocaust is found in every school
curriculum in Germany. At different stages, the Holocaust must be covered extensively
in history and civic studies, and may also feature in German literature, religion or
ethics classes. The Standing Conference of State Education Ministers, a member of
Germany’s International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working group, is
responsible for curriculum co-ordination. Memorial sites were established. Germany
conserves more than 2000 memorial sites that bear witness to the horrors perpetrated
by the Nazi regime. Approximately 200 of these are deemed of national import-
ance, including former concentration camps such as Buchenwald, Bergen-Belsen
and Oranienburg. Schools are encouraged to organise visits to memorial sites, documenta-
tion centres and museums; every year, several hundred thousand students visit these sites.21The 1980s and beyond: constitutional patriotism or ‘normal’ nation?
Although much has changed since the immediate post-war period, the Historikerstreit
(historians’ dispute) started in 1986. The argument was made that the Nazi murders
were a defensive reaction to the class murders during Stalinism. Philosopher Jürgen
Habermas responded that the authors were trying to whitewash Germany’s past and
the uniquely crime that was the Holocaust. Habermas further argued that instead of
relying on national culture, the Germans should rely on constitutional patriotism, i.e.
the values of a pluralistic liberal democratic constitution as a tool of unifying (West)
Germany. Constitutional patriotism was a move away from the notion of ethnically
homogeneous nation-states. While traditional patriotism consists of a political identity
centred around a nation’s historical traditions, constitutional patriotism is based on
identification with the universalist principles of democracy and human rights, as
enshrined in a particular constitution. As a result, a ‘post-national’ identity emerged.
Constitutional patriotism refers to the citizens who feel that they are a nation not
because they share a common culture, history or origin, but because they agree on the
organizational principles of the state (Habermas 1998).
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was introduced by the German-Arab sociologist Bassam Tibi in his book Europa ohne
Identität (Europe without identity) (1998). He defined the values of Germany’s consti-
tutional patriotism, namely modernity, democracy, secularism, the Enlightenment,
human rights and civil society (p. 39, p. 154), which in his view are also the values of
Europe. Tibi did not advocate a German monoculturalism, favouring cultural plural-
ism based on a value consensus. However, his proposal was altered by German con-
servatives, who demanded that immigrants should assimilate into a German
Leitkultur (Pautz 2010: p. 46). Because the red-green coalition government at the time
planned to introduce new laws for immigration and dual citizenship, the debate
attracted nationwide attention. In the view of Pautz (2010: p. 41), the Leitkultur de-
bate contributed to the discourse of ‘normalisation’ that began to take root in the
early 1980s. Conservative forces sought to re-establish a ‘normal’ German conscious-
ness by attacking the ‘culture of remembrance’. They sought to re-establish national
identity and consciousness within a European context, i.e. the safe realm of a ‘Euro-
pean identity’ formed by enlightenment and modernity. However, the Leitkultur was
heavily criticized by Habermas and others who claimed that the debate was increasing
xenophobia among the broader population (e.g. Habermas 2010).
The German ‘summer fairy tale’ during the 2006 World Coup ushered in a new
wave of patriotism and was also seen as a kind of normalisation. The Germans
showed themselves to be a people who were easy-going and that could party. The
rest of the world took notice of the friendly, open nation that had come a long
way since WWII (Seitz 2007). However, while the impacts of the ‘summer fairy
tale’ remain unclear, there is a consensus that the shadows of the past remain and
that Germany remains a “difficult fatherland” (Kielmansegg 2000: chapter 4; van
Deth 2001: pp. 29 f.); this is also illustrated by the rise of the Euro-sceptic right-
wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).Civil religion and remembrance culture in Japan
Civil religion and nation-building in pre-war Japan
Modern nation-building in Japan started with the Meiji Restoration of 1868. It was
carried out by the governing elite to defend Japan from likely colonisation by Western
countries, and to improve the unequal treaties with foreign nations.22 In its quest for a
new national and cultural identity, the Meiji state began to promote indigenous Shintô
as a state religion. In 1869, today’s Yasukuni Shrine (Yasukuni jinja), which plays a
major role in Japan’s culture of remembrance, was established under the name Tôkyô
Shôkonsha (shrine to summon the souls) in order to honour those who had died for
the royalist cause at the time of the Meiji Restoration. In line with Shintô belief, it hosts
the souls of the war dead, who are enshrined here as kami (souls or deities).
Soon after the Restoration, the Great Doctrine (Taikyô senpu) was issued. According
to this doctrine, the “way of the gods” was declared Japan’s government’s guiding
principle. It became official doctrine that Japan was a God-favoured country and thus
superior to all others (see Hardacre 1989: pp. 101–2; pp. 30–3). In contrast to trad-
itional Shintô, in which natural phenomena (e.g. the sun, mountains, trees, or rocks)
were worshipped, this newly designed State Shintôism venerated the Emperor.
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deity in the new system of State Shintôism; she is seen as the foremother of the
imperial family. Thus, Japan’s Emperor, who claimed to be a direct descendant of
Amaterasu, was sacred, and all his proclamations had a religious character. Ise shrine,
which was dedicated to Amaterasu, was declared Japan’s highest-ranking shrine. A system
of 13 rites were invented in which the Emperor performed before an audience of state
dignitaries (Hardacre 1989: p. 29).
To make Shintôism the only religion in Japan, Buddhism and Christianity were
discarded. Upon pressure from the Western powers, the Meiji state shifted to more
tolerant religious policies and eventually granted freedom of religion in the Meiji
Constitution, which was promulgated in 1889. This constitution stipulated that
“the Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors
unbroken for ages eternal” (Art. 1), and that the Emperor had full executive
authority and was the supreme commander of the army and the navy (Art. 4, 11).
Although the Empire of Japan is the oldest hereditary monarchy in the world,
Takayama (1993: p. 107) argues that State Shintôism was a newly designed religion
to ideologically control Japan’s people.
From the 1880s on, Japan’s government increasingly used education to teach nation-
alist ideas. Through a nationalist education, the Meiji government sought to strengthen
national and social unity. In 1890, it issued the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyôiku
chokugo), requiring students to ritually recite the oath to “offer yourselves courageously
to the State” as well as protect the imperial family. The basis of the Rescript was that
Japan’s unique form of government, the kokutai, was based on a historic bond between
benevolent rulers and loyal subjects, and that the fundamental purpose of education
was to cultivate virtues, especially “loyalty” and “filial piety”.23 The practice of emperor
worship was further spread by veneration of the imperial portrait. All these practices
were used to fortify national solidarity and gave pre-war Japanese nationalism a tint of
mysticism and cultural introversion (Hall: 1994, p. 321).
In the early 20th century, Japan grew into a major industrial-military power. Japan
saw its future in industrialisation and expansion but, being an island, it didn’t have the
resources to support this, so the Japanese sought to secure resources via invasion.
Disputes over Korea and Manchuria led to the first Sino-Japanese War with China
(Nisshin sensô) in 1894–95 and the Russo-Japanese War (Nichiro sensô) with Russia in
1904–05. The victories of the Japanese surprised the world and left Japan with a sphere
of influence extending over southern Manchuria and Korea.
Since the government and the economy needed new resources, this opened the
way for further Japanese expansionism. The government and the army repeatedly
supported imperialistically motivated aggression, as did large Japanese companies
looking for new resources, opening the way for the ascendancy of military suprem-
acy in politics. State Shintô provided a mythical justification for colonialism and
the actions of the Japanese military in the years leading up to WWII and Japan’s
defeat. Since Amaterasu was promoted the most important of the gods and was
given a national role, the sovereignty of the Emperor as her direct descendant was
secured by divine right. Further, it became official doctrine that, since Japan was a
God-favoured country, the Japanese were superior to all other races.24 Until the
end of WWII, Japan’s government used this “invented tradition” of State Shintôism
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nation-building, modernisation and, eventually, military expansionism and colonial-
ism (Mullins 1993: p. 76).
The Manchurian Incident in 1931 marked the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War,
although full-scale war would not start until 1937. According to Hobsbawm, the
incident was a milestone on the road to WWII (Hobsbawm 1994: p. 37).
On June 29, 1940, the concept of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Daitôa
kyôeiken) was announced via a radio address. It declared the will to establish a new
order in Asia, free from Western influence (De Bary 2008: p. 622). Soon thereafter the
Japanese launched their mission to bring Southeast Asia under their control and from
1942 onwards the Japanese controlled nearly all of East and Southeast Asia, which
provoked strong resistance among these nations. By the year 1945 anti-Japanese resist-
ance movements had emerged nearly everywhere in Asia.25Civil religion and remembrance culture post-war Japan
Zero hour in Japan: continuity and change
Shortly before the war’s end, Japan was bombed to ashes. Tôkyô was severely dam-
aged, as were other parts of Japan. On 26 July 1945, the Potsdam Declaration was
issued in the form of an ultimatum to hasten Japan’s surrender, without guarantee-
ing the status of the Emperor, Japan’s most important condition to capitulate (Bix
2001: pp. 496–504). Because Japan had said it intends to “ignore” (mokusatsu) the
Declaration, the Allies dropped nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
which killed thousands of people, also in the aftermath, many of whom were civil-
ians, mostly women and children. On August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito stated in
his Imperial Rescript on the Termination of War (gyokuon hôsô) that against the
background of the dropping of the atomic bomb a continuation of the fight would
not only lead to an ultimate collapse of the Japanese nation but also to the total
extinction of human civilization. It was not surprising that he did not mention any
Japanese aggression, instead he expressed his deepest regret to ‘our allied nations
of East Asia’ who cooperated with Japan to liberate Asia from Western
colonization.26 Tanaka (2013) has argued that the Rescript instilled in the people
the myth that Japan was forced to surrender by the inhumane atomic bomb and
thus cultivated an exclusive victim mentality. Powerful experiences of the bombings
were written during the occupation period, some suppressed by U.S. censorship,
and the Japan as victim myth began to snowball – a significant difference to the
case of Germany.27 In 1947, peace groups held the first Hiroshima Memorial Day,
which has since been held every year (Newman 1995: p. 158).
After the country’s defeat in WWII, Japan’s political system underwent radical
changes under pressure from the Allied Powers, especially the U.S. In September 1945,
General Douglas McArthur took charge of the Supreme Command of Allied Powers
(SCAP). Even though the other Allies had an advisory role, the SCAP had the final
authority to make decisions in Japan. As in Germany, a primary objective of the occu-
pation forces, namely the U.S., was to punish war criminals. The General Headquarters
(GHQ) carried out a far-ranging purge and prohibited persons who were active expo-
nents of militarism and militant nationalism from engaging in public service. In May
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war criminals, and several thousand as Class B or Class C war criminals. Six defendants
were sentenced to death by hanging for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
crimes against peace, including former Prime Minister Tôjô Hideki (1884 to 1948,
Prime Minister 1941 to 1944). Some preferred to die by their own hand.28
Concerning the new political structure, we find a major difference between Japan and
Germany: While the Germans wrote a new constitution by themselves, the Japanese
presented only minor changes of the Meiji Constitution. This can be attributed to the
fact that in Japan the draft was produced by the government under the supervision of
the then Minister of State and pre-war Minister of Commerce and Industry,
Matsumoto Jôji (1877–1954), while in Germany politicians who had been in oppos-
ition to the NS-regime negotiated the statutory stipulations. The GHQ rejected the
Japanese draft outright and ordered its staff to write a completely new document,
which was presented to the government in early 1946 (Bix 2001: pp. 568–579). In
this constitution, the Emperor’s role was reduced to that of a “symbol of the state” (Art. 1)
and in 1947 the Emperor had to issue the “Humanity Declaration” (Ningen sengen), in
which he had to deny all claims to be a living god. It also contained Article 9, the Peace
Article of the Constitution, which prohibits Japan from ever leading a war again or from
maintaining an army. Since the constitution was of foreign origin, it was a source of
controversy from the outset, specifically concerning the Emperor’s role and Article 9.
Besides, Shintô and the state were clearly separated, and Yasukuni Shrine too was made
independent from the state, and has since been privately funded.
The Cold War, ‘reverse course’ and the stabilising of conservative domination
The Cold War led to the Allied Occupation’s ‘reverse course’. After the promulgation
of the both Korean states and the communist takeover in Beijing, the GHQ ordered
the Japanese government to purge all Communist party officials from office – known
as the Red Purge (reddo pâji). Thousands of workers, trade unionists and public
servants were dismissed. At the same time, suspected Class A war criminals were
released from prison.29
The goal of supporting Japan against China and North Korea also led to the founding
of the Self Defence Forces (SDF) (Jieitai), which was prevention from the democratic
ideals of the constitution and enabled the established conservative elite to fortify their
ruling position (Kingston 2010: 13–4). In 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was
signed, which ended the occupation period, and Japan regained full authority.
As was true for Germany, Japan profited greatly from the Cold War. The Korean
War, which broke out in 1950, resulted in the swift recovery of Japan’s economy. The
rapid economic growth during the 1960s – known as the ‘economic miracle’ – rapidly
increased standards of living and gave rise to a new middle class. This new middle class
was greatly interested in stability, which led to a consolidation of the ruling position of
the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Jiyû minshu tô).30
Student protests and textbook discourse
Student protests in Japan were highly visible in the early post-war period. They
included a defence of the earlier, democratising and de-militarising reforms of the
Allied Occupation as well as the defence of the Peace Constitution, especially Article 9,
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workers’ interests against monopoly capital, and opposition to so-called ‘U.S. imperi-
alism’, which was at odds with defending the U.S.’s post-war democratic reforms
(Stockwin 2003: p. 232).
This position greatly resembled the major conflict lines in Japanese politics during
these times, namely between capital and labour and between a traditional and a
modern value orientation. While the LDP organised the rural, lower-educated older
generation, the leftist parties, the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) (Nihon shakai tô) and
the Communist Party (JCP) (Nihon kyôsan tô) organised the urban, better-educated
younger generation (Schmidt 2001). Both leftist parties tried to take over control of the
student movement, yet it established themselves as more or less politically independent.
The forming of the SDF in the 1950s and the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty
in 1960 provoked mass demonstrations against the Eisenhower visit. Also, the then
Prime Minister, Kishi (1896 to 1987, Prime Minister 1957 to 1960), a former Class A
war suspect and grandfather of current Prime Minister Abe Shinzô (born 1954, Prime
Minister 2006 to 2007, 2012-), who returned to political life after the ‘reverse course’,
was forced out of office. However, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the students
returned to their hometowns and villages. The Vietnam War provoked new student
protests in 1968 against ‘U.S. imperialism’. Specifically at Japan’s leading university, the
University of Tôkyô, the situation became so serious that the university closed for
several months. After the early 1970s, the universities swiftly returned to normal; by
the 1980s, observers were stunned by the students’ conservatism (rather than radical-
ism) (Stockwin 2003. p. 233).
From the outset, Japan’s government has effectively controlled the content of the
history textbooks used in secondary education. Some international observers perceive
this control to be Japanese nationalist efforts to whitewash the actions of the Empire of
Japan during WWII, and see it as an attempt to tone down or delete descriptions of
Japan’s wartime aggression, especially atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre. In 1965,
Saburo Ienaga, a prominent historian, filed the first of his three lawsuits against the
Ministry of Education, charging that the textbook approval process was unconstitu-
tional and illegal. His lawsuits lasted 30 years. In 1997, Japan’s Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the Ministry’s right to continue screening textbooks.31
Japan as number one: Shintô gods and economic growth
By the 1970s, the Japanese were living in one of the world’s most rapidly growing econ-
omies. Japan’s political and bureaucratic elite largely guided economic development via
extensive regulation and planning. Books such as Ezra Vogel’s Japan as number one:
Lessons for America appeared and became bestsellers in Japan and the West. Writings
on issues of Japanese national and cultural identity are subsumed under the term
nihonjinron, literally theories on or discussions of the Japanese (Sugimoto 2003: p. 4). It
was argued that Japanese social relations are the core of Japan’s economic success (e.g.
Nakane 1970). These forms of social relations were seen as being “uniquely unique” to
Japan and as providing the country with a unique advantage in building an advanced
industrial society (Sugimoto 2003: p. 15).
On 15 August 1975, the 30-year anniversary of Japan’s surrender in WWII, Prime
Minister Miki Takeo (1907 to 1988, Prime Minister 1974 to 1976) visited Yasukuni
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visited as an individual and not as prime minister. On 9 April 1979, surprisingly, it was
announced that the most prominent 14 Class A war criminals had been enshrined at
Yasukuni Shrine on 17 October 1978, along with 2,450,000 other war dead (Takayama
1988: pp. 331 ff.). Since then, official politicians’ visits to the shrine constitute a major
ritual in Japan’s culture of remembrance and show the alignment between Shintôism
and the conservative elite.
Another important factor is the various Yasukuni supporter groups, amongst them
the Izokukai, (Japan War-Bereaved Families Association), the main organization for
families of war dead in Japan. The organization has strong links to the LDP, because their
chairmen used to be well-known LDP politicians, like Okinori Kaya (1889–1977), who led
the organization between 1962 and 1977. Kaya, who was Minister of Finance from 1941
to 44, was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment as a Class A war criminal by the Allied oc-
cupation. However, he was paroled in 1955 and later served as LDP Minister of Justice.32
The relationship between the economy and the Shintô religion was equally important.
Most shops in Japan have a small shrine on their premises. Large enterprises revere a
local deity of the place where the company was founded. (Swyngedouw 1993: pp.
57 ff.). Since numerous festivals are held at these shrines, and the employees are
expected to participate, religious rites have survived and may even have increased in
both number and variety rather than declining in an industrial urban context. Owing to
this religious connection, the companies were deified and became omnipotent in
the lives of their employees (Lewis 1993: p. 166, p. 170)..33 While in pre-war Japan,
Shintôism was used to mobilise people for nationalist goals, it was now used to
mobilise people for economic success. This success has further stabilised the LDP’s long-
term ruling position. At the start of the 1980s, Japan entered a neo-traditionalist period
that stressed the ‘roots’ of Japanese society, and the media played a major role in the
production and marketing of tradition (Buckley 1993: p. 368).
The then Prime Minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro (born 1918, Prime Minister 1982 to
1987), was the first to visit the Yasukuni Shrine in an official capacity. He made the visit
along with his cabinet on 15 August 1985 (Takayama 1988: p. 335). Others followed,
which has led to severe criticism from China and South Korea, the main victims of
Japan’s aggression during WWII, who consider the shrine to be a glorification of Japan’s
past military aggression.
The end of economic growth and a regime change
At the start of the 1990s, Japan’s economy slowed markedly. With the burst of the
‘bubble economy’, an asset price bubble collapse, the economic miracle came to a
sudden end. The 1990s were called the “lost decade”; recently, however, the decade from
2001 to 2010 is often included, with the period referred to as the “two lost decades”.34
With the end of economic growth, Japan’s political system fell into turmoil. The loss
of political control and planning at the nation-state level had severe political conse-
quences. At the start of the 1990s, Japan’s long-ruling LDP was forced into a coalition
government with Japan’s Social Democrats, and Murayama Tomi’ichi (born 1924, Prime
Minister 1994 to 1996) became Japan’s first non-conservative Prime Minister after the
formation of the party system in 1955. On 15 August 1995, the 50th anniversary of the
end of WWII, Murayama apologised (in the “Murayama Statement” (Murayama
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suffering Japan had inflicted on its Asian neighbours. However, regime change formed
a short episode. Japan’s party system became very fluid, and there was a permanent
restructuring of the opposition camp, which benefited the LDP. In the “historical” elec-
tion of 2009, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which was formed at the
end of the 1990s, won, ousting the LDP from power after more than 50 years of conser-
vative rule. The 2011 triple catastrophe – when the strongest earthquake ever shook
Japan, followed by a strong tsunami, and the shameful handling of the Fukushima
nuclear accident following the earthquake and the tsunami – led to the end of DPJ
government. This sequence of events brought the LDP back to power. Under the guid-
ance of Prime Minister Abe, it is going “back to the roots”, as a solution to the current
problems (Schmidt 2001, 2011, 2012).
Already in the 1980s, Takayama (1988: p. 118) argued that the move towards a revi-
talisation of Japanese civil religion would inevitably mean the emergence of other
related issues, such as a reversal of those parts of the Constitution that refer to the
Emperor’s symbolic status, a revision of the Peace Article, or the restoration of trad-
itional ‘moral education’. This is also true for the current situation, illustrated by the
present discussion about revising Article 9 and an expanded role for Japan’s SDF forces.
Concerning these discussions, the Japanese public has been deeply divided from the
start. Polls show that the percentage of those in favour of a constitutional revision
shrunk from 41 % in 2007 to 28 % in 2015, while the percentage of those who oppose
revision has been relatively stable at 25 % in 2015 (NHK 2015).
In December 2013, the current Prime Minister Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine. In
February 2015, he said: “It is natural for the nation’s leaders to want to visit Yasukuni
Shrine to pay their respects to those who died for the country”.35 Even though Abe did
not visit the shrine at Yasukuni’s annual Spring Festival in 2015 so as to avoid diplo-
matic embarrassment, sending a ritual offering instead, 106 lawmakers from both the
government and the opposition visited the shrine, including three cabinet ministers,
which again infuriated South Korea and China.36 On 15 August 2015, the 70th anniver-
sary of the end of WWII, Abe again decided not to visit owing to diplomatic tensions;
however, despite severe criticism from China and South Korea, 60 politicians (including
several ministers) visited the shrine.37
The issue also frequently leads to domestic dispute, and Japan’s public is deeply
divided on this topic. In January 2014, for instance, 41 % of respondents in an Asahi
Shinbun poll had no problem with Abes’s visit to Yasukuni, while 46 % said he should
not have visited.38
Several proposals have been made to create a separate secular memorial where the
prime minister can make official state visits for memorial purposes; however, such pro-
posals are often blocked by the conservative elite and organizations like the Izokukai.39
Therefore, the shrine remains a subject of political debate in Japan and an obstacle to
meaningful relationships between Japan and its neighbours.
Further, in early 2014 the Abe government has issued new guidelines that ensure
that the history textbooks used in schools from 2017 onwards reflect the govern-
ment’s positions on territorial issues such as the disputed islands between Japan and
its neighbouring countries. These islands matter because of nearby shipping lines, fish
grounds and potential oil and gas fields. Further they are of military importance
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refer to the Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu (controlled by Japan and disputed with China)
and Takeshima/Dokdo (controlled by and disputed with South Korea) as “Japanese
territory”, which most likely will lead to a further worsening of Japan’s relations with
the neighbouring countries.40
Conclusions
Civil religion and remembrance culture are closely interrelated. Besides analysing
civil religion in (West) Germany and Japan in pre-war and post-war times, we
sought to highlight the differences and similarities of two civil religions and re-
membrance cultures in a comparative perspective. We hereby analyzed the struc-
tural factors as well as the influence of individual political behaviour, i.e. the
interaction of ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ in shaping the respective civil religion and re-
membrance culture. Table 1 summarizes the findings.
Both Germany and Japan were occupied by the Western Allies, and both integrated
large numbers of those responsible for war and war crimes into their society rather
than punishing them. Immediately after the war, neither the Germans nor the Japanese
were interested in coming to terms with their past. Both countries were subject to
Western integration, and both faced unprecedented economic growth. One of the
major differences between the two countries is their civil religions. The ethnicity-based
Nazi civil religion was consciously invented and designed by its leaders without any
deep cultural rooting in German society. Thus, it was easier to abandon an inappropri-
ate past. After the war, Germany no longer relied on strong nationalism-based politics.
Instead, it pursued European integration. Likewise, in Japan, State Shintô was invented
by the Meiji leaders’ however, in its apolitical form, it had long been a source of culture,
which is why it continues to influence perceptions of national identity and why it has
been more difficult to establish a critical dialogue with Japan’s past. Concerning the
sources of national pride, there was no clear break with the past in Japan; instead, links
were forged between pre-war Shintôism and tradition. Official visits to the Yasukuni
shrine by high-ranking politicians highlight the links between Japan’s political system
and Shintô tradition, which often provokes criticism form China and South Korea.
Thus, the pre-war totalitarian ideology in Japan was more embedded in the traditionalTable 1 Summary of differences and similarities of civil religion and remembrance culture in
Germany and Japan
Factors shaping civil religion and remembrance culture Germany Japan
Structure
(socioolocical factors)
1 Embededdness of totalitarian
ideologies in traditional culture
superfluous embedded
2 Collective experience Holocaust/guilt Nuclear bombings
3 Origins of post-war order endogenous exogenous
4 International environment European integration Communist threat
Agency
(political factors)
5 Impact of protest movement High impact
(68er generation)
No impact
6 Regime change Social-liberal
coalition
LDP one-party dominant rule
7 Control of education Holocaust included
into curriculum
Control of textbooks, esp.
with regard to war crimes
Source: Own compilation
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or superfluous.
In Germany, the severity of guilt prevented Germans from defending Nazi ideology
in public or to return to nationalism. In Japan, conversely, the bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki led to victim myths and the consciousness of being a victim rather than
perpetrator. There is another difference: Since Japan’s constitution was of Western
origin, or exogenous, it was and remains subject of political conflict: While the conser-
vative elite intends to revise parts related to defence and the Emperor’s role, the leftist
opposition strongly defends these articles. This fact undermines strong constitutional
patriotism in Japan as well as pride in its democratic laws, as has been the case in
Germany, where the origins of the post-war order can be described as more endogen-
ous, since it was designed by the Germans themselves.
While Germany has benefited from Western – specifically European – integration,
Japan was confronted with a conflicting communist environment concerning China
and North Korea. Japan took pride in its economic growth, linking it to the Japanese
nation and Japanese values and traditions, as well as Japanese uniqueness in Asia and
superiority in the world. Since the government has effectively controlled textbooks
concerning its past, this has contributed to an undigested historical past.
Although Germans, most of whom were linked to the Nazi regime, also sought to
forget about the past rather than cope with it, the 1968 student generation strongly
condemned Nazi aggression and demanded that the ‘father’ generation take responsibil-
ity, contributing to a public reappraisal of the past. Since then, public opinion has
shifted greatly towards accepting responsibility for what happened, and from authori-
tarian to libertarian values. This process, together with the airing of the Holocaust
series, have largely contributed to the fact that the past has been included in the school
curriculum. In Japan, the student protests were fairly visible, but dispersed suddenly
and had no further impacts on dealing with the past.
Regime change in Germany has also played a key role. The historic gesture of kneeling
before the monument of victims of the Warsaw uprising by SPD chancellor Brand, who
had been in exile during the Nazi regime, has highly contributed to reconciliation with
then communist Poland. In Japan, economic growth and the necessity of U.S.-Japanese
alignment in a critical environment has stabilised one-party dominant rule by the conser-
vatives, who have been reluctant to come to terms with the past. This only occurred in
1995, when the Socialists were in a coalition government and the then Prime Minister,
Murayama, first took full responsibility for the past, half a century later than in Germany.
For Germany, European integration, a resistance to nationalism and generational change
led to a specific form of Vergangenheitsbewältigung and the crimes of the Holocaust are sub-
ject of all school curricula. However, normalisation discourses, the financial and economic
crises, the refugee crisis and a weak political union have recently reinforced claims for more
national interest, specifically from the populist right. In Japan, the conflicting environment
has fostered close Japan-U.S. alignment instead of encouraging Asian reconciliation. Long
conservative rule and unprecedented economic growth has encouraged national pride in
Japan’s unique position in Asia and has led to a re-emergence of traditions rather than
encouraging a process of coming to terms with Japan’s past. While the sudden end to the
‘economic miracle’ has led to political turmoil and regime change, the LDP is back in power,
and the revision of the constitution and the SDF are back on the political agenda which
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South Korea, unlikely. The new move of the conservative elite to include the government’s
position on territorial disputes into the official school textbooks is also more likely to lead to
a considerable worsening of the diplomatic relations.Endnotes
1Comfort women hereby refers to women, especially in Korea, who were compelled
into sexual servitude for the nation’s wartime forces. The issue has been a constant
source of controversy since the early 1990s, when the media started to address it
seriously. However, in December 2015, Japan and Korea agreed to settle the issue of
comfort women in their first such deal since 1965. Japan has apologised and will pay 1
billion yen to fund victims, even though only 46 former comfort women are still alive
in South Korea. For instance, see BBC News (2015).
2For the term, see also Schmidt 2015.
3The relationship is a two-way one, since there is also a close relationship between
historical memory and rituals of commemoration in creating national identity. See e.g.
Isakhan 2011.
4For the debate on structure and agency as complementary forces see Bourdieu 1977
or Hurrlemann 1988.
51855 to 1927; the son in law of German composer Richard Wagner. His two-volume
book Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts claimed to prove the superiority of
the Aryan race.
61883 to 1946. Influential ideologue of the Nazi Party. Sentenced to death by hanging
during the Nuremberg trials.
71782 to 1814. The English version can be found at http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/pdf/eng/12_enlightphilos_doc.8_english.pdf. Accessed 2 June 2016.
81844 to 1900. Both concepts occur in several of his works, notably in Also sprach
Zarathustra, published between 1883 and 1891.
9Pearson (1994: pp. 33–34) for instance views the description of Nietzsche’s political
thought as fascist, or Nazi ideology as “absurd”. See also Kaufmann 1942.
10Until the reunification in 1990, the analysis is limited to West Germany.
11As for the trials, see www.kriegsverbrecherprozesse.nuernberg.de
12For the biographies of its members see: www.bpb.de/geschichte/deutsche-
geschichte/grundgesetz-und-parlamentarischer-rat/39043/biografien
13For the role of OMGUS and the political disputes between the parties and the vari-
ous occupation forces see Hahn 1993; Feldkamp 1998.
14See Gesetz zur Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse der unter Artikel 131 des Grundge
setzes fallenden Personen 1951.
15After several extensions of the deadline, Germany’s Parliament suspended the
limitation period for crimes against humanity in 1979.
16When the grand coalition with Chancellor Kiesinger passed the German Emergency
Law (Notstandsgesetze) on 30 May 1968, students heavily opposed it, arguing it was
similar to Hitler’s Ermächtigungsgesetz (Enabling Act).
17See for instance the documentation on Braune Universität. Deutsche Hochschullehrer
gestern und heute, edited by Rolf Seeliger et al. Volume 1–6, 1965–68.
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mentationszentrum der staatlichen Archivverwaltung der DDR 1965.
19See Award Ceremony Speech 1971.
20For the value change, see also Inglehart 1977 and Kitschelt 1995.
21See the Holocaust Remembrance Alliance w. y. Germany.
22Like other Asian nations, the Japanese were forced to sign unequal treaties with
Western powers. These granted Westerners one-sided economic and legal advantages
in Japan. The first of a set of treaties was signed in Kanagawa between Japan and the
U.S. (Kanagawa jôyaku) in 1854. For an overview of the treaties, see Auslin 2004.
23For the full text of the Rescript, see Tsunoda et al. 1964: pp. 139–140. However, many
observers noted that the Rescript was of Confucian origin, especially concerning human
hierarchies, which established a sound basis of proper relationships among people.
24Bellah (1967) has argued that the U.S. civil religion, the “American Way of Life” or
“American Shintô”, is a comparable concept.
25For this concept see Lebra 1975.
26For the full text see De Barry 2008: pp. 624–25.
27Another factor was the establishment of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission
(ABCC) by the U.S. to investigate into the effects of radiation. Since this commission
did not provide any medical care to the victims, it intensified feelings of being a victim.
28For the tribunal, see International Tribunal for the Far East 1948.
29For details, see Takemae 2002: p. 482.
30For details, see the various keywords in Schmidt 2003.
31For the textbook controversy, see Nozaki 2008.
32See: Nihon Izokukai. Homepage.
33Even though the participants take part only out of obligation to the company, be-
cause it is part of their job (ibid.).
34The country’s GDP fell, as did real wages, and Japan’s economic growth came to a
sudden end. In 2011, China overtook Japan as the world’s second-largest economy. See
BBC News 2011.
35See Japan Times 2015b.
36Japan Times 2015c. The visits came one day after Prime Minister Abe had held his
first substantial talks with China’s President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of a summit in
Jakarta.
37See Japan Times 2015a, and Yahoo News 2015.
38See Asahi Shinbun 2014.
39For an overview of this topic, see Mochizuki 2010.
40See Japan Times 2016. For the territorial disputes see e.g. Drifte 2005.Abbreviations
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